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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DARRELL LAWRENCE WESSENDORF, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANT 
Case No. 880186 
ARGUMENT 
The State, in its brief, page ten, acknowledges that 
the distinction between manslaughter and negligent homicide was 
defined in State v. Dyer 671 P.2d 142 (Utah 1983) by quoting the 
following language: 
The only difference between reckless and 
criminally negligent conduct is that under 
the former, one perceives a risk and 
consciously disregards it, whereas under the 
latter, one fails to even perceive the risk. 
The risk in both cases must be of such a 
degree that an ordinary person would not 
disregard or fail to recognize it. The 
distinction, then, is merely one of the 
degree of the perception of the risk. 
As cited in defendant's appeal brief, Boggess 
v. State 655 P.2d 654 (Utah 1982) further emphasized 
the difference between manslaughter when it said: 
The gravamen of the crime of negligent homicide is the 
same as that for reckless manslaughter. The only 
distinction between the two crimes is the mental state 
of the defendant at the time the crime was committed. 
In one, the actor perceives the risk but unreasonably 
disregards it; in the other, he simply negligently 
fails to perceive the risk." (Emphasis Added). 
1 
That the test is a subjective test, i.e. for 
manslaughter, the defendant did know of the risk and for 
negligent homicide, he should have known is re-asserted in State 
v. Bryan 709 P.2d 257 (.Utah 1985): 
"Under the criminal code, a defendant, to have acted 
with 'recklessness1, must be consciously, and therefore 
subjectively, aware of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk of causing a death. See §76-2-103(3). 
. . . . 
Under the manslaughter statute, the defendant must have 
actually known of the risks; simply disregarding risks 
which he should have been aware of is not sufficient to 
sustain a conviction under that provision." (Emphasis 
Added). 
Also see State v. Watts 675 P.2d 566 (Utah 1983) 
Consequently the principal is well established that 
the distinction between the two offenses is that the defendant 
did know the risk for manslaughter and that he did not know, but 
should have known for negligent homicide. 
As a result the State in its brief has attempted to 
glean from isolated and sometimes "out of context" bits of 
evidence or testimony to support the State's conclusion 
that"...it becomes clear that the risk was more than something 
that defendant ought to have been aware of. He was, indeed, 
aware of the risk but chose to disregard it." 
As the Supreme Court of the State has so often stated, 
the appellate court will not reverse on a factual findings of the 
trial court, whether it is a jury or a bench trial unless it is 
either clearly erroneous or so lacking and substantial that a 
reasonable person could not have reached the verdict which the 
jury did reach. The reason for that is obvious, of course. 
2 
The trier of facts has the benefit of observing the 
witnesses, their demeanor and the sincerity, etc., of their 
behavior while on the stand. The Appellate Court does not have 
that benefit, and often, the cold written word conveys a far 
different meaning than the speaker may have intended, as 
demonstrated by his inflection, tone of voice, etc. 
The fact is that in this case the trial judge with the 
benefit of having heard all of the evidence, in context, and 
observing the witnesses (some of whom contradicted other 
witnesses) made a finding of fact. He asked himself the 
question, "did the defendant know his conduct created a grave 
risk of death to another?" 
The trial court's definitive reply was that he did not! 
See again, the language used by the trial judge: 
Did the defendant know his conduct 
created a grave risk of death to another? 1^  
find that he did not. The definition of 
"knowing" as set out in our code is set out 
in 76-2-103 Subsection (2). The latter part 
of that sections says: "A person acts 
knowingly or with knowledge with respect to a 
result of his conduct when he is aware that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause 
the result." 
In order to find that the defendant knew 
that his conduct created a grave risk of 
death to another, I would have to find that 
he was reasonably certain that if he exposed 
that snake to Stevie, that she would be 
bitten and die. The evidence just doesn't 
support that finding. 
This is a subjective analysis which I 
base on the facts that I've heard in the 
case. I'm convinced that the defendant 
subjectively believed that he had the snake 
calmed and somewhat under control, and that 
it would not bite. 
The defendant obviously had convinced 
himself, in spite of the warning that he had 
received to the contrary, that the snake was 
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not dangerous, and that there was no grave 
risk of death to anyone under these 
circumstances. (Emphasis added) (Sentencing 
transcript, page 4-5) 
After making that clear and less than ambiguous finding 
of fact, which the State passes of as, merely, that the trial 
court's "...choice of words may have been, on occasion, confusing 
as to the legal standard he was applying." 
The court demonstrated that its error was not, in the 
facts it found, but rather, the law that it applied. 
The Court on page nine of the Sentencing transcript 
stated: 
It is uncontroverted in this case that the 
ordinary person in the defendant's 
standpoint—in other words, trying to decide, 
"Do I expose this child to this snake or 
not?"—would consider the defendant's act of 
placing the snake on the child's 
shoulder—which is his version of what 
happened—a gross deviation from the standard 
of care which a reasonable man would 
exercise. (Emphasis added) 
That statement by the Court, using the term "reasonable 
man" was obviously applying an objective standard, ie«,— what 
the defendant should have known, the test for negligent homicide. 
The court attempted to apply that to manslaughter. That was the 
error of law applying the negligent homicide (objective) 
standard to find manslaughter. In fact, that defendant did not 
know, but should have perhaps known, is negligent homicide. 
The court further demonstrated its confusion on that 
issue, when it proceeded to say: 
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I want to note at this point that the 
defendant is bound by an objective standard 
and not a subjective one. Counsel has 
previously argued that the language as viewed 
from the act-or standpoint involves some sort 
of a subjective test. Such is not the case. 
If the legislature had intended a subjective 
standard, they would not have included the 
language relating to the "reasonable man" 
standard. (The court may have been 
thinking of the use of the term "ordinary 
person" when it used the term "reasonable 
man") since the statute does not use the word 
"reasonable man", but does use "ordinary 
person" in a slighty different context.) 
Obviously if we take a reasonable man and 
then give him all the subjective features of 
the defendant, there's no use in using the 
"reasonable man" standard, we should simply 
state it as a subjective standard. By 
indicating a "reasonable man" standard, 
legislature was indicating they intended an 
objective test. The cases cited above, of 
course, say precisely the opposite! 
What the Court described is, of course, the offense of 
negligent homicide, not manslaughter, because it is indeed an 
objective standard for negligent homicide, as opposed to a 
subjective standard for manslaughter. 
The Court further demonstrated its confusion as to the 
legal standard to be applied when it again stated: 
And I find that a reasonable man using 
reasonable care in those circumstances would 
not have placed a snake—an unrestrained 
rattlesnake—in that proximity to a child. 
(Sentencing transcript page 10) 
That is a legal conclusion, but it applies to the 
offense of negligent homicide, not manslaughter. 
The court then continued: 
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Because of my findings stated above, I 
will not explore the elements of negligent 
homicide stated in the cases counsel have 
cited. The only difference between 
manslaughter and negligent homicide is 
the perception of the risk involved in the 
defendant's activity. (Emphasis added) 
The Court demonstrated its mis-reading of the Dyer case 
and others which, while using the terms "perception of the risk," 
qualify that term. 
The Dyer case Supra states that, in manslaughter, 
"...one perceives the risk and consciously disregards it." 
(Emphasis added) That is a subjective application of the 
"perception of the risk" to which the trial court referred. 
The Dyer case then went onn to point out that in the 
case of negligent homicide "...one fails to even perceive the 
risk." That there is a risk, but the actor fails to perceive it, 
creates an objective standard for that offense. 
The court attempted to apply an objective standard to 
manslaughter, but did so erroneously. 
What the court did do, is find that the defendant did 
not know his conduct created a grave risk of death to another! 
The Court found: 
In order to find that the defendant knew 
that his conduct created a grave risk of 
death to another, I would have to find that 
he was reasonably certain that if he exposed 
that snake to Stevie, that she would be 
bitten and die. The evidence just doesn't 
support that finding. (Emphasis added) 
A recent case decided by the Utah Supreme Court, State 
v. Standiford 98 Utah Adv. Rep 43 has further clarified the 
necessary elements for a conviction of manslaughter, on page 47 
when it said: 
Reckless manslaughter, therefore, is 
committed under §76-5-205 when one causes a 
death by engaging in conduct which the actor 
knows creates a "substantial and 
unjustifiable risk of death. (Emphasis 
added) 
The Standiford case supra again pointed out that: 
The sole difference between reckless 
manslaughter and negligent homicide is 
whether the defendant actually knew of the 
risk of death or simply was not, but should 
have been aware, (page 50) 
The State, in its brief, attempts to pass of the 
Court's finding by saying, the Court's "choice of words" was 
confusing, but the State cannot sweep under the rug the very 
clear finding by the Court that while defendant should have known 
of a risk, he did not! 
The State's only alternative then is to attempt to 
discredit the Court's factual finding, and does spend most of its 
brief on points, it contends, shows that the Court's factual 
finding was wrong. 
Nevertheless, to attempt to call into question, a 
trial court's factual finding, by citing isolated statements in 
the record, contradicts the clear role of an appellant court, 
which will not reverse, except in very rare instances, the 
findings of fact of the trial court. 
One of the prime reasons appellate courts follow that 
policy is, of course, reflected in the state's brief. 
Some examples from the State's brief will illustrate 
that point. 
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The State on page three of its brief stated that: 
"Defendant and Kelton proceeded to share the bottle (Tequila) on 
their return to LaVerkin." (T.392) 
That statement, alone, would suggest on its face that 
defendant must have consumed a large amount of liquor—even as 
much as half of the bottle. 
But what was actually testified to, and what is in the 
record, is that defendant had taken "a couple hits" i.e. a couple 
swallows, and that anything more, that was drunk from the bottle 
was drunk by Wellis Kelton, not the defendant. But even then, 
the entire bottle was not all consumed on the way home, though 
the State's statement would suggest that conclusion.(See all of 
page 392) 
Also on page three, of its brief, the State states: 
Sitting out under the shade tree, defendant and Kelton finished 
off the bottle of Tequila and waited for Mrs. Kirkwood's return." 
(T.291, 394) 
Again that statement would suggest defendant drank a 
large amount of the liquor, possibly half or more of the bottle. 
But the record does not support that conclusion. What 
was actually testified to, was that Willis Kelton said, "What the 
hell. Let's go ahead and drink it, and we'll get another one for 
the weekend." Defendant agreed, but said he was "... kind of 
watching his intake because he had a job interview that day." 
That suggests he didn't drink very much, because he knew he had 
to be on this best behavior for a job interview. There is no 
evidence in the record to contradict that, either. 
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There was, in fact, no evidence to suggest defendant 
was inebriated, as the State then concludes on page twelve of its 
brief when it says, "...Defendant's consumption of alcohol likely 
caused him to be less cautious and careful than he may have 
ordinarily been." 
The Court was in a much better position to listen to 
the testimony and draw its conclusions as to the facts that 
existed, rather than are the State's appellate attorneys, or even 
the Appellate Courts. 
Other such examples are represented by the statement 
referred to on page thirteen of the State's brief which quotes: 
"He (defendant) asked Vaughan Gubler and Alan Shelley if they 
wanted to hold the snake and called them "chickens" when they did 
not. (T.25, 475)" 
That, in those cold words, would suggest the defendant 
was some kind of heartless individual who was baiting the two 
young men. 
What the Court heard, however, was one of the young 
men, Alan Shelly, testified that defendant did not attempt to 
chase or taunt them with the snake (T.468) and that "...The 
little kids—as they was coming home from school, they'd—of 
course they seen him holding the snake, and they stopped. But he 
didn't go running after them, or anything like that." (T.469) 
contrary to the State's characterization of the evidence. 
Also contrary to the State's assertion that defendant 
taunted and chased Mrs. Kirkwood and her son, Lyle, (State brief 
page thirteen) Shelly testified "He never approached her. He was 
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just playing with the snake" (.472) "and he didn't approach Lyle, 
who was across the street." (T.437) 
As to defendant's having called Mr. Shelly chicken for 
not wanting to handle -the snake, Mr. Shelly testified after a 
question posed by the prosecuting attorney, that he (defendant) 
said it "... just in a joking manner." 
Certainly these examples show that the trial court, is 
in the best position to judge the meaning and intent of 
testimony, and what the facts actully were. 
The State on page four of it's brief said, in 
attempting to show that defendant did not know the effects of a 
snake bite, had been bitten when five years of age and taken to a 
hospital for treatment. That was apparently quoted to 
demonstrate defendant's knowledge of the critical nature of a 
snake bite. 
The State, however, didn't go on to point out to the 
court that defendant also testified, in addition to being bitten 
that one time when five years of age, and taken to the hospital, 
that he had been bitten numerous times by rattlesnakes, at least, 
four or five times when there was penetration of the skin 
(T.379), that he suffered no consequences, did not even go to the 
hospital except the time he was five years of age, when his 
father took him. (T.379) 
Defendant testified he never even got sick from those 
bites. Just a little swelling. (T.380) That is certainly a 
different impression than the State attempted to convey by its 
selecting one statement and highlighting it. 
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Again, the court heard all the testimony and the 
evidence, not just the out-of-context statements supplied by the 
State in its brief. 
Finally, as another example, the State on page fifteen 
of its brief, "He (defendant) also looked away from Stevie, to 
look at her, allowing the snake to bite. (T.40) Again the 
statement is meant to demonstrate, apparently the great disregard 
defendant had for the child, but what the State's citation does 
not demonstrate is that Jeri, the child's mother, was holding a 
gun, considered shooting defendant, according to her testimony, 
and screamed at defendant at least three times a pretty good 
explanation for his momentary distraction. (T.29-30) 
These are the kinds of things the trier of fact looks 
at, hears, and considers in making it's findings of fact. 
The Appellate Court is definitely at a disadvantage 
when it tries to second guess the trial court. 
The trial court found the defendant was not aware that 
his conduct created a grave risk of death to another. (Sentencing 
transcript p.4) 
While the Court did make some statements in support of 
his judgement of guilty of manslaughter, it is clear he did so 
under the mistaken assumption of the applicable law—the 
distinction between negligent homicide and manslaughter. 
Defendant's conviction should be reduced to, negligent 
homicide, and he should be exonerated of the more severe 
manslaughter conviction mistakenly imposed by the Trial Court. 
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POINT II 
While it was not argued at the trial before the court, 
defendant submits that if this Court does not believe the 
appropriate conviction is of negligent homicide, rather than 
manslaughter, at most, defendant should be convicted under the 
facts of the case of only a third degree felony, Allowing Vicious 
Animal to Go at Large, §76-9-304 of the 1988 Utah code. 
That section reads: 
Any owner of a vicious animal, knowing its 
propensities, who willfully allows it to go at 
large or who keeps it without ordinary care, 
and any animal, while at large, or while not 
kept with ordinary care, causes injury to 
another animal or to any human being who has 
taken reasonable precaution which the 
circumstances permitted, is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor unless the animal causes the 
death of a human being, whereupon the owner 
is guilty of a felony on the third degree. 
The facts of this case certainly fall under that 
proscription much more readily than under the manslaughter 
statute, of which defendant was convicted by the lower Court. 
Where the case was tried to the Court, without a jury, 
and no instructions were required to enlighten a lay jury as to 
the law, it would be appropriate for an Appellate Court to apply 
the law to the facts that is most appropriate, and make a 
determination that the defendant is guilty only of §76-9-304 as 
as opposed to manslaughter. 
That specific section, dealing with vicious animals, 
obviously was intended by the legislature, to pre-empt the 
application of the standard criminal homicide statutes in the 
instance where an animal is the direct cause of the death of 
another. 
i o 
Wherefore defendant respectfully submits this court 
should reduce his conviction from manslaughter, a second degree 
felony, to negligent homicide, a class A misdemeanor, or at most 
to Allowing Vicious Animal to Go at Large, a fefftLrd degree felony. 
Respectfully submitted this ^() ^"ifey-of 
, 1989. 
J^/MacArthur Wright 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Paul Van Dam, Attorney General and Barbara Bearnson, 
Assistant Attorney General, attorney for respondent, ftp 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, on this 
February, 1989. 
J'. MacArthur Wright 
13 
